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Transfers of Piracy Suspects - A Crucial 
Element of the Regional Prosecution Strategy 
in Light of Human Rights Law
Anna Petrig*
Summary: I. Transfers for prosecution: rationale and current procedure; II. A conditional right not to be 
transferred flowing from non-refoulement; III. Current transfer procedure and the procedural dimension 
of non-refoulement; A. Necessity of individual non-refoulement assessment despite transfer agreement; 
B. Assessment of reliability and effectiveness of transfer agreements; C. No procedural framework for 
carrying out a non-refoulement assessment; IV. Reconciling human rights prescripts with operational 
constraints.
I. TRANSFERS FOR PROSECUTION: RATIONALE AND CURRENT 
PROCEDURE
The United Nations Security Council‘s call to fully1 and durably2 elimi-
nate Somali-based piracy has been heeded by an unprecedented number 
of actors. States from all over the world and three multi-national missions 
- Operation Atalanta conducted by the European Union Naval Force (EU-
* Dr. Anna Petrig, LL.M., is a post-doc researcher at the University of Basel (Swit-
zerland). The issue of transfers of piracy suspects to third States for their criminal 
prosecution is governed by both international law, namely the law of the sea and 
human rights law, and domestic law. While this contribution analyzes the legality 
of transfers from a human rights perspective, the article by Dr. Giorgia Bevilacqua 
entitled “Transfers of piracy suspects - a crucial element of the regional prosecu-
tion strategy in light of international law of the sea”, which is included in the book 
at hand, covers the issue from a law of the sea perspective. The two articles are part 
of a larger project of the study group on law enforcement at sea, which is part of 
Working Group 3 on International Maritime Security and Border Surveillance of 
COST Action IS1105, MARSAFENET (network of experts on the legal aspects of 
maritime safety and security; www.marsafenet.org).
1 UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 (UNSC Res 1846), 
preambular, paragraph 10.
2 UNSC Res 2125 (18 November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 (UNSC Res 2125), 
preambular, paragraph 30.
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NAVFOR), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‘s (NATO) Operation 
Ocean Shield and the Combined Task Force 151 operated by the Combi-
ned Maritime Forces - currently implement the counter-piracy law enforce-
ment framework off the coast of Somalia and the Indian Ocean3.
The natural goal of every law enforcement operation is to bring alleged 
criminals to justice. However, as regards counter-piracy operations, the im-
plementation of this basic tenet has proven difficult. Patrolling naval States 
taking piracy suspects captive are often unwilling or unable to prosecute 
them in their domestic courts. In such cases, the seizing State generally 
works towards surrender for prosecution of the suspects to a third State, 
mainly located in the region prone to piracy (so-called regional States)4. 
This implies that with each seizure, the path to prosecution has to be paved 
anew: a decision must be taken whether to release the seized person or to 
submit the case for investigation and prosecution to either the competent 
authorities of the seizing State or a third State. This process is referred to 
as “disposition procedure”. To facilitate this task, various States, as well as 
the European Union (EU), have entered into transfer agreements with re-
gional States in which the latter declare their general willingness to accept 
piracy suspects for prosecution, subject to their consent in each individual 
case and the fulfilment of specific conditions laid down in the respective 
agreement5. If a prosecuting State can be successfully identified in a spe-
3 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy 
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia” (21 October 2013) UN Doc 
S/2013/623, paragraph 37 seq.; UNSC Res 2125, preambular, at paragraph 14.
4 Between the start of the operation in December 2008 and the end of January 
2014, EUNAVFOR has, for example, transferred a total of 47 piracy suspects to 
the Seychelles: EUNAVFOR Somalia, “Suspect Pirates Apprehended by EU Naval 
Force Flagship Transferred To The Seychelles” (30 January 2014) <http://eunav-
for.eu/suspect-pirates-apprehended-by-eu-naval-force-flagship-transferred-to-the-
seychelles/> accessed 30 April 2014. 
5 Anna Petrig, Human Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea: Arrest, Detention and Transfers 
of Piracy Suspects (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, forthcoming), Part 1/III/B: Ken-
ya was the first State to conclude a transfer agreement with the EU in March 
2009: Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Government 
of Kenya on the conditions and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected 
of having committed acts of piracy and detained by the European Union-led na-
val force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in the possession of EUNAVFOR, 
from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such transfer [2009] OJ 
L79/49 (EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement). Despite expiration of the agreement 
in September 2010, Kenya has declared its continued readiness to accept piracy 
suspects for prosecution on an ad hoc basis; in these cases, the provisions of the 
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cific case, transfers6 (rather than extraditions) are the prevalent means by 
which to surrender the suspects to that State.
Neither NATO nor the Combined Maritime Forces have adopted their 
own detain-and-transfer scheme for their respective counter-piracy ope-
rations. Rather, States contributing to these multinational missions revert 
back to national control for arrest and detention of piracy suspects and 
the disposition of their cases, i.e. the decision whether to prosecute piracy 
suspects in the seizing State, to opt for a transfer to a third State or to release 
them. This is different from EUNAVFOR, which is the sole multinational 
counter-piracy mission pursuing a unique transfer policy. Within this fra-
mework, the decision whether and where to prosecute the captured suspects 
is not a matter falling solely within the national competence of the contri-
buting States nor is the process entirely controlled by EUNAVFOR. Rather, 
the disposition of these cases is characterized by a rather complex interplay 
between various actors, namely EUNAVFOR and the seizing State7.
terminated transfer agreements were applied mutatis mutandis: UNSC, “Report 
of the Secretary-General on specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other 
States in the region” (20 January 2012) UN Doc S/2012/50, paragraph 78. The 
Seychelles was the second regional State to enter into a transfer agreement with 
the EU: Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Republic of 
Seychelles on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Suspected Pi-
rates and Armed Robbers from EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for 
their Treatment after such Transfer [2009] OJ L315/37 (EU-Seychelles Transfer 
Agreement). Since 2011, a transfer agreement between the EU and Mauritius is in 
place: Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on 
the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from 
the European Union-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the con-
ditions of suspected pirates after transfer [2011] OJ L254/3 (EU-Mauritius Trans-
fer Agreement). A number of regional States concluded transfer agreements with 
patrolling naval States; these agreements will not be discussed here since they are 
not publicly available (see below III.B).
6 The notion of “transfer” is not of a technical nature with a precise meaning. Rath-
er, it is an umbrella term referring to the various techniques and procedures used 
to bring a piracy suspect within the jurisdiction of a third State for prosecution 
without having to resort to formal extradition proceedings. As we will see later in 
this article, the procedures in which transfers of piracy suspects are decided vary 
depending on the actors involved and sometimes even from one situation to an-
other; however, they feature some common characteristics, which will be present-
ed in this article and based on which the present human rights analysis rests.
7 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2, contains two case studies based on expert interviews, 
which describe in detail two disposition frameworks: that of Denmark, which con-
tributes to NATO and the Combined Maritime Forces, as an example for disposi-
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The disposition practices of the various actors contributing to counter-
piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and the region differ. And yet, the 
procedure in which transfers of piracy suspects to third States are evalua-
ted, negotiated and decided upon has some common features, regardless 
of the framework in which it takes place. First of all, the decision to trans-
fer is issued in a procedure that fundamentally differs from extradition, 
which is the traditional and formal mechanism to surrender an alleged 
criminal for prosecution. A transfer is the result of negotiation and coope-
ration between two States or between a State and EUNAVFOR, rather than 
a surrender in execution of a decision issued by an administrative and/or 
judicial body in a formalized procedure described in a legal act. Another 
common feature is that the decision to transfer is not subject to judicial re-
view. Moreover, the potential transferee is not party to the process that may 
ultimately result in his transfer. Consequently, he does not benefit from 
any procedural safeguards before the seizing State‘s authorities, such as the 
right to submit reasons against his transfer or to be represented by counsel. 
At most, the piracy suspect is informed of the fact that attempts are being 
made to identify a prosecution venue or that his surrender is imminent. 
A second important characteristic of the current transfer process is that 
no individual non-refoulement assessment takes place. Rather, it is argued 
that suspects are only transferred to States with which transfer agreements 
have been concluded. Such agreements, in turn, are only concluded if the 
respective State‘s human rights record in the relevant fields does not give 
rise to any concerns. Put differently, it is argued that the global non-re-
foulement assessment carried out when concluding a transfer agreement 
makes an individual non-refoulement assessment regarding a specific pi-
racy suspect to be transferred obsolete. What is more, transferring States 
generally do not request individual assurances from the receiving State re-
quiring, for instance, that a specific transferee is actually detained in one 
of the prisons specifically refurbished for the purpose of hosting alleged 
pirates8. Rather, it is maintained that the respective transfer agreement in 
combination with the exercise of monitoring rights are sufficient to ensure 
tion taking place in an interstate setting and that of EUNAVFOR, which provides 
insights into disposition occurring in a multinational context. The article at hand 
focuses on the EUNAVFOR transfer framework.
8 The UNODC played an active role in the refurbishment of prisons used to house 
persons suspected or convicted of acts of piracy: UNODC, “Counter Piracy Pro-
gramme: Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects” (March 
2013) <www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//piracy/UNODC_Brochure_
Issue_11_wv.pdf> accessed 30 April 2014. 
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that transferred persons are not subject to human rights violations in the 
receiving State during investigation, trial and the potential enforcement of 
their sentences9.
This article explores - from a human rights perspective - the legality of 
transfers of piracy suspects as such (II.) and, in greater detail, the legality of 
the transfer procedure currently being pursued in counter-piracy operations 
off the coast of Somalia and the region (III.). The main legal yardstick 
applied is the principle of non-refoulement in its substantive and procedu-
ral dimensions as granted by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the Convention Against Torture (CAT)10. The conclusion will be that 
human rights law (similar to the law of the sea11) does not offer an absolu-
te right not to be transferred for prosecution at all, but that the principle 
of non-refoulement can bar the transfer of a specific suspect to a specific 
destination. We will further assert that the current transfer procedure is 
not necessarily in line with the procedural requirements flowing from the 
principle of non-refoulement. In light of this, a discussion follows whether 
and how respect for these procedural prescripts granted by virtue of the 
prohibition of refoulement can be reconciled with the operational cons-
traints and specificities of counter-piracy operations, most notably that sus-
pects are detained on board law enforcement vessels and never enter the 
land territory of the transferring State (IV).
II. A CONDITIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE TRANSFERRED 
FLOWING FROM NON-REFOULEMENT
Human rights law – specifically the ECHR, ICCPR and CAT – does not 
confer alleged criminals an absolute right not to be surrendered for prose-
9 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2/III.
10 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (1950) 213 UNTS 221 
(ECHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 De-
cember 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 
UNTS 113 (CAT).
11 See Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Frame-
work for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (2011), 148-149 and 
197.
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cution to a third State12. Consequently, transfers of piracy suspects are 
not per se in breach of human rights law. Both the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have 
repeatedly opined that the right not to be surrendered for prosecution 
is not included as such among the rights and freedoms of the ECHR13. 
Rather, the Strasbourg organs have recognized the “beneficial purpo-
se of extradition in preventing fugitive offenders from evading justice” 
and have held that it is in the interest of all nations that fugitives are 
brought to justice14. Similarly, the ICCPR does not contain an absolute 
right against surrender for prosecution. In the words of the Human 
Rights Committee: “There is no provision of the Covenant making it 
unlawful for a State party to seek extradition of a person from another 
country”15. On the contrary, extradition is considered to be “an impor-
tant instrument of cooperation in the administration of justice”, which 
aims at preventing so-called safe havens “for those who seek to evade 
fair trial for criminal offences”16. Finally, an absolute right not to be 
surrendered for prosecution is also absent from the CAT17.
While there is no absolute right not to be surrendered to a third State 
for prosecution under human rights law, transfers do not fall outside the 
material scope of the mentioned human rights treaties either. For instance, 
the European Court of Human Rights decided that “in so far as a measu-
re of extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of 
a Convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not too 
remote, attract the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant 
Convention guarantee”18. Hence, under certain circumstances, the ECHR 
indirectly prohibits a specific transfer if its effects would potentially vio-
12 Geoff Gilbert, Responding to International Crime (2006), 139-140.
13 For the European Commission on Human Rights see, e.g., Lynas v Switzerland, 
App no 7317/75 (ECom Decision, 6 October 1976), 1. of the legal considerations; 
for the Court see, e.g., Soering v the United Kingdom, App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 
July 1989), paragraph 85; and Shamayev and others v Georgia and Russia, App no 
36378/02 (ECtHR, 12 April 2005), paragraph 427.
14 Soering v the United Kingdom, n. 13 above, at paragraphs 86 and 89.
15 MA v Italy, Comm no 117/1981 (HRC, 10 April 1984), paragraph 13.4.
16 Cox v Canada, Comm no 539/1993 (HRC, 31 October 1994), paragraph 13.4.
17 Isabelle Moulier, “Extraordinary Renditions and the United Nations Convention 
against Torture”, in M. Nowak and R. Schmidt (eds.), Extraordinary Renditions 
and the Protection of Human Rights (2010), 151.
18 See, e.g., Soering v the United Kingdom, n. 13 above, at paragraph 85; and Gonzalez v 
Spain, App no 43544/98 (ECtHR, 29 June 1999), 4. of the legal considerations.
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late one or several rights guaranteed by it. Similarly, different provisions 
of the ICCPR may operate to the effect that a transfer is prohibited in a 
concrete case. Emphasizing that “extradition as such does not fall outside 
the protection of the Covenant”19, the Human Rights Committee found 
communications to be admissible ratione materiae where the author did “not 
claim that extradition as such violates the Covenant, but rather that the 
particular circumstances related to the effects of his extradition would rai-
se issues under specific provisions of the Covenant”20. On the merits, the 
Human Rights Committee has decided in various cases that extradition is 
prohibited where substantial grounds exist for believing that the individual 
to be surrendered faces a real risk of irreparable harm in the receiving 
State, such as those risks prohibited by the right to life21 and the right not 
to be subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment22. Thus, while 
the ICCPR does not outlaw surrenders for prosecution as such, a speci-
fic transfer may be prohibited if it would violate specific rights under the 
Covenant. Lastly, similar to the ECHR and ICCPR, a concrete measure of 
removal for the purpose of criminal prosecution in the receiving State may 
be prohibited because it violates Article 3(1) CAT stipulating that “[n]o 
State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture”23.
In sum, human rights law does not provide piracy suspects with an abso-
lute right against surrender for prosecution. But various human rights pro-
visions implicitly or explicitly prohibit the seizing entity from transferring 
a specific piracy suspect to a specific destination if there is a real risk that 
certain of his rights and freedoms will be violated in the receiving State24. 
This conditional right not to be surrendered for prosecution is embodied 
in what is referred to as the prohibition of refoulement.
19 Everett v Spain, Comm no 961/2000 (HRC, 9 July 2004), paragraph 6.4.
20 See, e.g., Kindler v Canada, Comm no 470/1991 (HRC, 30 July 1993), paragraph 
6.1 (emphasis added); and Cox v Canada, n. 16 above, at paragraph 10.3 (empha-
sis added).
21 Article 6 ICCPR.
22 Article 7 ICCPR.
23 Moulier, n. 17 above, at 151. 
24 While Article 3 CAT mentions the principle explicitly, various provisions of the IC-
CPR and ECHR have been interpreted as containing a refoulement prohibition.
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III. CURRENT TRANSFER PROCEDURE AND THE PROCEDURAL 
DIMENSION OF NON-REFOULEMENT
Essentially, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits the forced re-
moval of a person to a State or territory where he risks being subjected to 
certain human rights violations. Which potential human rights violations 
may bar a specific surrender for prosecution depends on the specific trea-
ty; among them are the risks of being subjected to ill-treatment and torture 
- notably by exposure to harsh prison conditions or corporal punishment 
- or to the death penalty. The risk may be present in the State receiving the 
suspect for prosecution (direct removal: transfers) or in any other State 
he may ultimately be transferred to, notably for the enforcement of his 
sentence (indirect removal: re-transfers)25. The latter type of surrender is 
important against the background that various regional States accepting pi-
racy suspects for prosecution require convicted pirates to be transferred to 
another State to serve their sentences26. For instance, the Seychelles ente-
red into a transfer for enforcement agreement with the Somali Transitional 
Federal Government, Puntland and Somaliland27.
This substantive obligation of the principle of non-refoulement is com-
plemented by a procedural dimension28, which is a création purement préto-
rienne29 and quintessential to the actual implementation of the protection 
afforded by the prohibition of refoulement. The gist of it is that national 
authorities of the State exercising effective control over the person sub-
ject to removal are under an obligation to determine whether there is a 
risk of the person being subjected to certain human rights violations upon 
surrender30. This obligation has to be discharged proprio motu and on an 
25 Kees Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement (2009), 
25-26. 
26 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy 
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia”, n. 3 above, at paragraph 48.
27 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 
1950 (2010)” (25 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/662, paragraph 67.
28 Cordula Droege, “Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and 
contemporary challenges”, 90 International Review of the Red Cross (2008), 669, 679.
29 The notion is used by Frédéric Sudre, “Article 3”, in E. Decaux, P. H. Imbert and 
L. Pettiti (eds.), La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: Commentaire article par 
article (2nd edn., 1999), 161, regarding the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR as to 
include a non-refoulement component.
30 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “There‘s no place like home: States” obligations in relation 
to transfers of persons”, 90 International Review of the Red Cross (2008), 703, 731.
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individual basis, that is with regard to the specific person to be removed 
and regarding a specific removal destination. This, in turn, requires the 
establishment of respective assessment procedures, including the review of 
a negative removal decision.
Up to now, there is no specific case law by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, the Human Rights Committee or the Committee against Tor-
ture on the procedural dimension of the principle of non-refoulement in 
the context of transfers of piracy suspects. In light of this, it is important 
to note that the prohibition of refoulement found in the ECHR, ICCPR 
and CAT respectively applies to all forms of removal. Furthermore, the 
principle of non-refoulement as it has developed in relation to one form of 
removal (e.g. expulsions in the realm of immigration) also applies mutatis 
mutandis to other forms of removal (e.g. extradition), including rather new 
forms such as “renditions to justice” occurring in counter-terrorism opera-
tions or transfers of piracy suspects31.
A. Necessity of individual non-refoulement assessment despite transfer 
agreement
The transfer procedure as currently pursued does not grant piracy sus-
pects an individual non-refoulement assessment. Transferring entities take 
the stance that by concluding transfer agreements with prosecuting States 
of the region, which prohibit ill-treatment, torture and the imposition of 
the death penalty on transferred piracy suspects, respect for the principle of 
non-refoulement is sufficiently ensured. They argue that such agreements 
are only concluded if the State or the EU respectively deems the prison 
conditions and the manner in which criminal cases are investigated and 
prosecuted by the receiving State to be in line with international human 
rights law generally and the guarantees protected by the prohibitions of 
refoulement specifically. Such a general assessment of the human rights si-
tuation in the receiving State makes a non-refoulement assessment with re-
gard to a specific piracy suspect to be transferred obsolete. In other words, 
according to EUNAVFOR, an individual non-refoulement assessment ta-
31 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture: A Commentary (2008), 195-196; Wouters, n. 25 above, at 29 (in general) 
and 317-318 (on Article 3 ECHR specifically); Droege, n. 28 above, at 671; Jacques 
Hartmann, “The European Convention on Human Rights and Extradition”, in K. 
H. Kaikobad and M. Bohlander (eds.), International Law and Power: Perspectives on 
Legal Order and Justice: Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick (2009), 25-26.
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king into account the specificities of a given case is not deemed necessary 
in light of the global non-refoulement assessment, which is carried out be-
fore the conclusion of a transfer agreement with regard to the whole coun-
try and all persons potentially transferred to it in the future32.
Any discussion surrounding the argument that an individual non-refou-
lement assessment can be dispensed with because of the existence of a 
transfer agreement first necessitates a thorough understanding of the con-
tent of such agreements. As a general rule, transfer agreements concluded 
between patrolling naval entities and regional States contain a clause in 
which the latter declares its willingness to accept piracy suspects for pro-
secution, subject to its consent in each individual case33. Moreover, they 
determine the obligations of the seizing entity, most notably that it pro-
vides assistance to the regional State in the investigation and prosecution 
of transferred piracy suspects, and contains technical rules on the imple-
mentation of transfer decisions34. Of greater interest in the context of the 
non-refoulement principle is that transfer agreements generally stipulate 
that transferred persons must be treated humanely and not be subjected 
to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, notably while detained, and must 
be granted certain rights regarding the investigation and prosecution of 
their cases35. Furthermore, various transfer agreements, particularly those 
with retentionist States, contain a clause prohibiting the imposition of the 
death penalty36. Finally, the agreements regulate the issues of tracing and 
monitoring37 and re-transfer to States other than the prosecuting State38.
Actors involved in the transfer of piracy suspects generally do not la-
bel transfer agreements as diplomatic assurances39. However, these agree-
ments are concluded specifically to prevent transfers from taking place in 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement. This is evidenced by Article 
12(3) CJA Operation Atalanta, which is invoked as the legal basis for the 
32 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2/III.
33 See, e.g., Article 1 EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement.
34 See, e.g., Articles 3 and 7 EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement. 
35 See, e.g., Article 4 EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement.
36 Even though Mauritius is an abolitionist State, Article 5 EU-Mauritius Transfer 
Agreement prohibits imposition of the death penalty against transferred persons.
37 See, e.g., Article 6 EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement.
38 See, e.g., Article 4(8) EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement. 
39 For an exception where transfer agreements are explicitly designated as diplo-
matic assurances, see Re ‘MV Courier’, 25 K 4280/09 (Verwaltungsgericht Köln, 25. 
Kammer, 11 November 2011), paragraph 23.
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transfer agreements entered into by the EU40, stipulating that “[n]o per-
sons … may be transferred to a third State unless the conditions for the 
transfer have been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent with 
relevant international law, notably international law on human rights, in 
order to guarantee in particular that no one shall be subjected to the death 
penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”41.
The rationale of transfer agreements - especially their clauses stipula-
ting the human rights obligations of the receiving State - is to exclude or 
minimize the risk of transferred piracy suspects being subjected to human 
rights violations upon surrender that amount to a violation of the principle 
of non-refoulement. Since transfer agreements are concluded in order to 
enable surrender for prosecution to regional States and thus appear to 
have the same function and purpose as diplomatic assurances, we must 
apply the principles developed for evaluating the latter as regards their re-
liability and their effectiveness in preventing a violation of the principle of 
non-refoulement. The same holds true for the question whether a transfer 
agreement can replace an individual non-refoulement assessment, as enti-
ties engaging in transfers of piracy suspects suggest.
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights suggests that the 
mere receipt of diplomatic assurances does not allow a removing State to 
claim compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This holds true 
even if the receiving State is party to international human rights treaties. In 
Saadi v Italy, as well as in more than a dozen subsequent cases, the Court re-
fused to allow the removing State to discharge its obligations flowing from 
the principle of non-refoulement by simple reference to the diplomatic 
assurances it obtained. The same follows from the views of the Committee 
against Torture. Rather, diplomatic assurances are but one piece of evidence 
to be taken into account when assessing whether there is a real risk that 
40 See third preambular consideration of Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP of 12 
July 2011 on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pi-
rates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to 
the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer 
[2011] OJ L254/1 (Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP).
41 Article 12(3) Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the 
launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast (Atalanta) [2008] OJ L330/19 (Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP).
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certain human rights of the person subject to removal will be violated upon 
surrender42.
From this follows that the assessment of whether a real risk exists that 
the human rights of a transferee will be violated upon his transfer and 
whether assurances received can remove such a risk must both be asses-
sed with regard to a specific person subject to removal43. Against this bac-
kground, we must reject the proposition of actors involved in transfers of 
piracy suspects that no individual non-refoulement assessment in neces-
sary in light of the global non-refoulement assessment carried out prior to 
concluding a transfer agreement. Rather, the seizing State must determine 
with regard to each piracy suspect subject to transfer whether there is a risk 
that certain of his human rights will be violated post-transfer and whether 
the respective transfer agreement can remove such a risk44. Answering the 
latter question requires an evaluation of the assurances in transfer agree-
ments in terms of their reliability and effectiveness in securing the human 
rights of the transferee upon surrender.
B. Assessment of reliability and effectiveness of transfer agreements
As regards the assessment of the reliability and effectiveness of diploma-
tic assurances - which transfer agreements essentially are when looking at 
their function and purpose - various criteria have been developed in the 
42 For the ECtHR, see Saadi v Italy, App no 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008), 
paragraphs 147-148; Alice Izumo, “Diplomatic Assurances against Torture and Ill 
Treatment: European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence”, 42 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review (2010-2011), 233, 258-259; Alexander Lorz and Heiko Sauer, 
“Wann genau steht Art. 3 EMRK einer Auslieferung oder Ausweisung entgegen?: 
Eine Systematisierung der Rechtsprechung des EGMR zu den Beweisanforderun-
gen für die Konventionswidrigkeit aufenthaltsbeendender Massnahmen”, 37 Eu-
ropäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (2010), 389, 404; Gillard, n. 30 above, at 743. For 
the Committee against Torture, see Nowak and McArthur, n. 31 above, at 150.
43 Lorz and Sauer, n. 42 above, at 404.
44 In Re ‘MV Courier’, n. 39 above, at paragraph 23, Germany, the respondent State, 
refers to the EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement and states that diplomatic assurances 
are, in principle, an appropriate and effective means to exclude a certain type of 
treatment that could potentially violate certain human rights upon transfer; how-
ever, it then states that this would not relieve the State of the obligation to assess 
whether the assurances provide sufficient protection in the individual case.
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jurisprudence of human rights supervisory bodies, some of which are inter-
nal and others external to the assurances45.
One external factor of utmost importance for the assessment of the re-
liability and effectiveness of diplomatic assurances is the human rights si-
tuation in the receiving State46. An evaluation of whether regional States 
investigating and prosecuting piracy cases or enforcing sentences against 
convicted pirates generally respect human rights in these fields goes be-
yond the scope of the present article, but is an important piece of the ove-
rall assessment.
Among the internal factors for the assessment of the reliability and effec-
tiveness of diplomatic assurances is their consistency and content, which 
must be sufficiently specific, explicit and clear47. Yet transfer agreements 
are not without ambiguities, notably in terms of their scope of application. 
For instance, the wording of the EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement suggests 
that it only applies to persons suspected of piracy but not those persons 
suspected of armed robbery at sea - even if such distinction does not ap-
pear to be made in practice48. Moreover, the scope of application of the 
EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement can be read in different ways. Article 
1(a) defines the conditions and modalities for “the transfer of persons sus-
pected of attempting to commit, committing or having committed acts of 
piracy within the area of operation of EUNAVFOR, on the high seas off the 
territorial seas of Mauritius, Madagascar, the Comoros Islands, Seychelles 
and Réunion Island, and detained by EUNAVFOR”.
This provision can be understood as encompassing persons involved in 
pirate attacks carried out on the high seas in general and, if so, the transfer 
agreement would then have a broad scope of application. However, if read 
this way, the specification “off the territorial seas of Mauritius, Madagascar, 
the Comoros Island, Seychelles and Réunion Island” would be superfluous. 
This suggests a narrower interpretation, according to which the provision 
aims at delimiting the area covered by the agreement to a specific part of 
the high seas. This latter interpretation would be in line with the Govern-
45 Izumo, n. 42 above, at 260.
46 Ibid, at 264-273; Lorz and Sauer, n. 42 above, at 406.
47 Izumo, n. 42 above, at 264; Lorz and Sauer, n. 42 above, at 405.
48 Geiss and Petrig, n. 11 above, at 200-201.
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ment of Mauritius’ reading of the clause, taking the view that the defined 
area covers the exclusive economic zones of the mentioned States49.
Another ambiguity relates to the important issue whether the consent of 
the seizing State (or the EU) is necessary in cases of re-transfer of suspected 
pirates to a third State for investigation and prosecution or the re-transfer 
of convicted pirates from the regional prosecuting State to a third State for 
the enforcement of their sentences. The answers are not clearly found in 
any of the publicly available transfer agreements. The EU-Kenya Transfer 
Agreement stipulates that transfers for the purpose of investigation or pro-
secution from Kenya to any other State are subject to prior written consent 
from EUNAVFOR50. However, the agreement does not contain a similar 
provision requiring the consent of EUNAVFOR in order to transfer a con-
victed pirate to another jurisdiction for enforcement of his sentence. The 
re-transfer clause in the agreement between the EU and the Seychelles 
is formulated in a broader fashion and stipulates that the latter “will not 
transfer any transferred person to any other State without prior written 
consent from EUNAVFOR”. As a result, the consent requirement is not 
explicitly limited to transfers for the purpose of investigation or prosecu-
tion51. The provision can thus be read as subjecting transfers for enforce-
ment of sentences to the consent of EUNAVFOR, which is important since 
the Seychelles is generally unwilling to enforce the sentences of transferred 
persons and concluded transfer for enforcement agreements with Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland52. Finally, the EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement 
includes a clause on transfers of suspects to a third State for enforcement 
of their sentences53, but none regarding re-transfers for investigation or 
prosecution. While under the other two transfer agreements “prior written 
consent from EUNAVFOR” is necessary in order to transfer persons to a 
third State54, the threshold is lower in the EU-Mauritius Transfer Agree-
ment which reads: “Mauritius may, after consultation with the EU, transfer 
such persons convicted and serving sentence in Mauritius to another Sta-
te … with a view to serving the remainder of the sentence in that other 
49 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on specialized anti-piracy courts in Soma-
lia and other States in the region”, n. 5 above, at paragraph 96.
50 Article 3(h) Annex to EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement.
51 Article 3(h) EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement.
52 See above text relating to FN 27.
53 Article 4(8) EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement.
54 Article 3(h) EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement; EU-Seychelles Transfer Agreement.
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State”55. Should the human rights situation in the receiving State raise se-
rious human rights concern, no transfer shall take place “before a satisfac-
tory solution will have been found through consultations between the Parties 
to address the concerns expressed”56. How this actually works in practice 
remains to be seen, but the EU assumes that if it were to oppose a transfer 
for enforcement to a specific State, Mauritius would (for political rather 
than legal reasons) not engage in doing so57.
Another important factor for evaluating the effectiveness and relia-
bility of diplomatic assurances is whether their provider is in a capacity 
to actually ensure their respect58. In the context of piracy, the internal 
actor responsible for negotiating and concluding transfer agreements 
is generally the executive branch (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Thus, it 
is notably questionable whether the assurance that the death penalty 
will not be imposed is binding upon the judiciary ultimately sentencing 
convicted pirates.
An additional crucial factor to consider regarding the reliability and 
effectiveness of diplomatic assurances is the possibility of monitoring com-
pliance with such assurances post- surrender59. In this context, it bears 
mentioning that the EU-Seychelles Transfer Agreement does not contain 
any provisions on tracing and monitoring and that they can only be found 
in a Declaration issued by the European Union60. Since the Declaration 
was neither explicitly refused nor openly accepted by the Seychelles, it is, 
however, unclear whether the Seychelles considers itself bound by it61. Fur-
thermore, from a law of treaties perspective, it seems obvious that a treaty 
may not impose an obligation on a State not party to it absent consent 
(pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt)62. However, against the background that 
a prosecuting State may re-transfer convicted pirates to third States for en-
55 Article 4(8) EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement (emphasis added).
56 Article 8(4) EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement (emphasis added).
57 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2/II/B/6/b.
58 Izumo, n. 42 above, at 261; Lorz and Sauer, n. 42 above, at 405.
59 Izumo, n. 42 above, at 262-263; Lorz and Sauer, n. 42 above, at 405-406.
60 Declaration by the European Union on the Occasion of the Signature of the Ex-
change of Letters between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on 
the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Suspected Pirates and Armed 
Robbers from EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for their Treatment 
after Such Transfer [2009] OJ L315/43 (Declaration).
61 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2/II/B/6/a/aa.
62 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn., 2008), 928.
262 Anna Petrig
forcement of their sentences, the limitation that monitoring rights only 
apply vis-à-vis the prosecuting State, with whom the transfer agreement has 
been concluded, bears mentioning. For transfers by EUNAVFOR to Kenya, 
this may be even more problematic since (as we have just seen) re-transfers 
do not seem to require EUNAVFOR’s consent. An added ambiguity regar-
ding monitoring ensues from the fact that the transfer agreements entered 
into by the EU do not explicitly mention the transferring State as a benefi-
ciary of the monitoring rights in addition to the EU and EUNAVFOR. Fur-
thermore, not all of these transfer agreements specify who may exercise the 
monitoring rights once Operation Atalanta is terminated and EUNAVFOR 
dissolved63.
The doubts expressed so far about the reliability and effectiveness of the 
assurances contained in transfer agreements concluded in the context of 
counter-piracy operations pertains to publicly available agreements. Howe-
ver, not all transfer agreements are public. While those entered into bet-
ween the EU and regional States are published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union, the agreements concluded bilaterally between two 
States are not public, with the exception of the agreement between Den-
mark and Kenya, which was released upon its termination. This contradicts 
the requirement formulated by various supervisory bodies that the issuan-
ce of diplomatic assurances must not involve any secrecy and that they must 
be open to judicial control64.
We rejected earlier the proposition that transfer agreements can repla-
ce an individual non-refoulement assessment. The transferring entity must 
rather assess in each specific case whether there is a real risk of human 
rights violations upon transfer and whether the assurances contained in 
the respective transfer agreement can remove such risk. In order to answer 
the latter question, assurances must be evaluated in terms of their reliabi-
lity and effectiveness. Without reaching a definite conclusion in this res-
pect, it must be stressed that the criteria speaking in favour of reliable and 
effective assurances are not always fulfilled regarding transfer agreements 
concluded between the EU and regional States. In other words, whether 
they can in fact remove the risk of human rights violations upon transfer 
must be questioned at the very least.
63 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2/II/B/6/a/bb.
64 Nowak and McArthur, n. 31 above, at 150.
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C. No procedural framework for carrying out a non-refoulement assessment 
An individual non-refoulement assessment (part of which pertains to 
the question whether the assurances in transfer agreements can remove 
the risk of human rights violations upon surrender) can only be carried 
out if an appropriate procedural framework is in place. In cases where 
alleged offenders are surrendered by means of extradition, these proce-
edings provide an appropriate framework for arguing against surrender 
based on non-refoulement considerations65 and for a non-refoulement 
assessment. Similarly, appropriate procedures for carrying out an initial 
non-refoulement assessment are generally also in place in the realm of im-
migration law: most States provide for a refugee status determination pro-
cedure by a specific authority during which a non-refoulement claim can 
be formulated and assessed66. Yet, in the context of piracy where surrender 
for prosecution is obtained by transfer rather than extradition and where 
transferees usually do not qualify as refugees67, it may not be readily ob-
vious within which framework, by whom and how the required non-refou-
lement assessment must be carried out. Generally, no specific procedural 
framework exists.
However, seizing States are, by virtue of the procedural component of 
the principle of non-refoulement (and the broader obligation to respect 
and ensure human rights)68, under an obligation to provide for an appro-
priate framework for an initial non-refoulement assessment. This implies 
that they must establish appropriate procedures and designate an authority 
competent to carry out the initial non-refoulement assessment69.
Generally speaking, piracy suspects are likely unaware of the existence 
of the prohibition of refoulement and how to avail themselves of its protec-
tion. In light of this, it is important to stress that transferring States must 
arguably undertake a non-refoulement assessment ex proprio motu - that is, 
65 An argument against removal based on non-refoulement considerations can be 
made by either invoking human rights provisions containing a non-refoulement 
component (Sibylle Kapferer, The Interface Between Extradition and Asylum (2003), 
41-43) or by relying on a ground for refusal of extradition, which incorporates 
the idea of non-refoulement (see, e.g., Sections 5 and 6 UNODC, “Model Law on 
Extradition” (2004) <www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf> accessed 
30 April 2014) during extradition proceedings.
66 Gillard, n. 30 above, at 731.
67 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 3/II.
68 See, e.g., Article 2(1) ICCPR.
69 Wouters, n. 25 above, at 411; Gillard, n. 30 above, at 731.
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regardless of whether a person expresses his fears concerning a potential 
transfer or formulates a non-refoulement claim. This has been stressed by 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Ja-
maa and others v Italy, a case concerning a push-back operation at sea invol-
ving more than 200 persons70. At the very least, the seizing State is under an 
obligation to inform piracy suspects in a timely manner about the existence 
of the non-refoulement principle and how to claim protection from it71.
Furthermore, the individual has a right to challenge his removal deci-
sion72. Under the ECHR and ICCPR, the right to have a transfer decision 
reviewed follows from a combined reading of the respective prohibitions 
of refoulement and the right to an effective remedy73. Even though the 
CAT does not contain a free-standing right to an effective remedy, the 
Committee against Torture interprets Article 3 CAT - the non-refoulement 
provision of the convention - as implicitly containing a right to an effecti-
ve remedy74. All three human rights treaties provide indications as to the 
70 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, App no 27765/09 (Grand Chamber, ECtHR, 23 Feb-
ruary 2012), paragraphs 132-33, where the Grand Chamber rejected the proposi-
tion of the respondent State that the persons removed did not expressly request 
asylum and held that “it was for the national authorities, faced with a situation in 
which human rights were being systematically violated … to find out about the 
treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after their return”. It then 
concluded that the absence of an express claim for protection does not exempt 
the removing State from its obligations flowing from the principle of non-refoule-
ment. See also Gillard, n. 30 above, at 731; and Droege, n. 28 above, at 679.
71 For a summary of the obligation to provide information about the existence of rights 
(notably the principle of non-refoulement) and procedural aspects in the context of 
asylum procedures, see, e.g., UNHCR, “Statement on the Right to an Effective Rem-
edy in Relation to Accelerated Asylum Procedures: Issued in the context of the pre-
liminary ruling reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union from the 
Luxembourg Administrative Tribunal regarding the interpretation of Article 39, Asy-
lum Procedures Directive (APD), and Articles 6 and 13 ECHR” (21 May 2010) <www.
unhcr.org/4deccc639.pdf> accessed 30 April 2014, paragraphs 14-15. 
72 Wouters, n. 25 above, at 412; Gillard, n. 30 above, at 731.
73 For the ECHR, see Wouters, n. 25 above, at 331-342; for the ICCPR, see Wouters, 
n. 25 above, at 412. Arguably, Article 13 ICCPR, which explicitly stipulates a right 
to have a removal decision reviewed, applies to piracy suspects subject to transfer: 
Petrig, n. 5 above, Part 5/III/C/2/a.
74 CAT Committee, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against 
Torture: United States of America” (25 July 2006) UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 
paragraph 20; Agiza v Sweden, Comm no 233/2003 (CAT Committee, 20 May 
2005), paragraph 13.7; Akauz v France, Comm no 63/1997 (CAT Committee, 9 
November 1999), paragraph 11.5.
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characteristics such review procedures must feature. Above all, the right to 
review must be “effective”75. Effectiveness notably implies that the remedy 
must be granted prior to removal and have suspensive effect76. In the con-
text of piracy, two interests potentially clash with respect to granting a right 
to lodge an appeal with suspensive effect prior to surrender. On the one 
hand, patrolling naval States are interested in keeping detention on board 
their ships short in duration, not only because warships generally lack fa-
cilities specifically designed for detention or only have adequate deten-
tion facilities for a modest amount of suspects, but also because detention 
absorbs the already scarce resources, notably in terms of personnel. On 
the other hand, transferring piracy suspects before their non-refoulement 
claims are thoroughly assessed may expose them to a risk of irreparable 
harm, which cannot (or can only partially) be compensated with a remedy 
only available in the receiving State, the exercise of which is more illusio-
nary than real in the context of Somali-based piracy. Another component 
of the effectiveness of the remedy is that it must be accessible, i.e. available 
in both law and practice77. Special efforts may be necessary in the context 
of piracy in order to make the remedy accessible - such as providing piracy 
suspects subject to transfer not only with sufficient information about the 
existence of such remedy, but with translation services and access to free 
legal representation as well78.
75 See, e.g., Agiza v Sweden, n. 74 above, at paragraph 13.8.
76 For the ECHR, see Wouters, n. 25 above, at 341-342, citing Gebremedhin [Gaberama-
dhien] v France, App no 25389/05 (ECtHR, 26 April 2007), paragraph 66. Domes-
tic authorities must thus provide a remedy capable of preventing the execution of 
a removal measure, either by setting forth that the ordinary appeal proceedings 
have automatic suspensive effect or by enabling the person subject to removal to 
apply for a provisional measure, i.e. an urgent procedure that brings the execu-
tion of a removal order to a halt. For the ICCPR, see, e.g., Alzery v Sweden, Comm 
no 1416/2005 (HRC, 25 October 2006), paragraph 11.8, where the Human Rights 
Committee emphasized that the opportunity to appeal the removal decision must 
be granted prior to surrender. The remedy would otherwise be ineffective because 
it could not “avoid irreparable harm to the individual” - rather, it would be “otiose 
and devoid of meaning”.
77 HRC, “General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”, in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Vol. I (2008), para-
graph 15.
78 Wouters, n. 25 above, at 413: in concluding observations, the Committee has stat-
ed that asylum-seekers must have full access to early and free legal representation 
so that their rights under the Covenant receive full protection.
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IV. RECONCILING HUMAN RIGHTS PRESCRIPTS WITH 
OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Human rights law, and specifically the procedural component of the 
principle of non-refoulement, is unequivocal: States are under an obliga-
tion to carry out an initial non-refoulement assessment on an individual 
basis and they must grant an effective remedy against the removal decision. 
The existence of transfer agreements, which contain clauses that are tanta-
mount to diplomatic assurances, does not release transferring entities from 
these obligations. Neither does the special maritime context alter these re-
quirements per se. The ECHR, ICCPR and CAT apply extraterritorially and 
in a maritime context based on the exercise of de jure jurisdiction by the 
seizing State through the flag State principle and/or the exercise of de fac-
to jurisdiction by virtue of effective control wielded over piracy suspects79. 
The same holds true for the principle of non-refoulement contained in 
these treaties. Since the decision to transfer, i.e. the phase of disposition 
where the principle of non-refoulement is of utmost importance, is genera-
lly taken vis-à-vis piracy suspects held on board the law enforcement vessel 
of the seizing State, the prohibition of refoulement applies extraterritoria-
lly qua the flag State principle. Furthermore, when a State is in a position to 
transfer a person to a third State for prosecution, it can be said to exercise 
the requisite level of effective control over such a person for its human 
rights obligations to apply extraterritorially based on the exercise of de facto 
jurisdiction80. In Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights applied Article 3 ECHR to applicants held on board a warship 
on the high seas81. While the Grand Chamber discussed the extraterritorial 
application of the rights and freedoms of the Convention on board vessels 
in general82, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque explicitly stated in his concu-
79 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 3/III/A.
80 Anja Klug and Tim Howe, “The Concept of State Jurisdiction and the Applicabil-
ity of the Non-Refoulement Principle to Extraterritorial Interception Measures”, in 
B. Ryan and V. Mitsilegas (eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges 
(2010) 91-96 (“4. The applicability of the non-refoulement principle in the con-
text of extraterritorial interception measures”). For Article 3 CAT, see, e.g., Sonko 
v Spain, Comm no 368/2008 (CAT Committee, 25 November 2011), paragraphs 
10.2 and 10.3, and JHA v Spain, Comm no 323/2007 (CAT Committee, 21 Novem-
ber 2008), paragraph 8.2. On the extraterritorial application of the non-refoule-
ment provisions of the ECHR, see Wouters, n. 25 above, at 217-221, specifically 
with regard to persons held on board ships, see 219.
81 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, n. 70 above, at paragraphs 110-138.
82 Ibid, at paragraphs 70-82.
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rring opinion that “[t]he prohibition of refoulement is not limited to the 
territory of a State, but also applies to extra-territorial State action, inclu-
ding action occurring on the high seas”83.
Despite the clearly formulated procedural obligations arising from the 
principle of non-refoulement and their applicability to persons subject to 
surrender, who are held on board a warship and who will never enter the 
land territory of the removing State, operational challenges arise in the im-
plementation of these prescripts. The question thus arises how and whether 
the human rights prescripts set out in this article can be reconciled with 
the operational constraints and specificities of counter-piracy operations.
Among the operational challenges are that the case is in limbo during 
disposition, the very objective of which is to determine whether and, if so, 
in which criminal forum the criminal prosecution of the particular pira-
cy suspect will take place. Only once the latter issue is decided, will it be 
clear whether and to which destination a transfer will take place and a 
non-refoulement assessment can begin. Until such a decision is taken, a 
considerable amount of time may pass84. Then, the assessment and review 
of the removal decision as such may be time consuming, notably due to 
the difficulty in establishing the facts - such as the identity and personal 
situation of the suspects and the situation in the receiving entity (especially 
as regards Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland). This implies that the sus-
pects could potentially be detained on board the warship for a rather long 
period of time - a situation for which most deployed ships are not equip-
ped since their intended use is for conduct of hostilities rather than law 
enforcement operations. Some States contributing to the counter-piracy 
operations, however, have adapted their ships specifically for counter-pira-
cy operations. For instance, Norway constructed cells on board its frigate 
Fridtjof Nansen85.
Another challenge may arise from the fact that the personnel on board 
a warship is not necessarily trained to properly carry out non-refoulement 
83 Ibid, concurring opinion, at 68-69 (regarding the CAT and ICCPR) and 78 (re-
garding the principle of non-refoulement under the ECHR).
84 For instance, in the case of the piracy suspects seized by Danish forces on 2 Jan-
uary 2009 and physically handed over to the Netherlands on 10 February 2009, 
40 days elapsed between arrest and transfer: Re ‘MS Samanyolu’ (Judgment), LJN: 
BM8116 (Rotterdam District Court, 17 June 2010), English translation provided 
by UNICRI.
85 Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 4/I/A/2/a/aa.
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assessments and that there may be language barriers between them and the 
transferee. Thus, the Grand Chamber criticized the respondent State in 
Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy because “the personnel on board the military 
ship were not trained to conduct individual interviews and were not assis-
ted by interpreters or legal advisers”86. An alternative to providing specific 
training to military personnel deployed to counter-piracy operations - as 
States seem to be under an obligation to do regarding every person tasked 
with carrying out a non-refoulement assessment87 - consists of deploying 
civilian officers (and translators), who are responsible for conducting the 
relevant procedures if they take place on dry land. Instead of deploying 
civilian officers, there is the option of using video-link. Spain and Denmark 
have used video-link not for non-refoulement assessments, but in order “to 
bring” the piracy suspects before a judge within hours after seizure and 
thus as a means to safeguard the right to liberty88.
In the realm of transfers of piracy suspects, the procedural dimension 
of the principle of non-refoulement currently has little effect. Arguably, 
the exceptionality of the circumstances in which surrenders for prosecu-
tion of piracy suspects are decided - notably that the alleged offenders are 
often detained on board law enforcement vessels and never enter the land 
territory of the transferring State - require some concessions regarding the 
granting of procedural rights. However, a lower standard seem unjustified 
where the failure to grant procedural safeguards flowing from the prohibi-
tion of refoulement is essentially due to a lack of planning and preparation 
because of missing practice, legal bases or political will.
86 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, n. 70 above, at paragraph 185.
87 The Committee against Torture has stressed that State officials carrying out the 
initial assessment must be adequately trained: Wouters, n. 25 above, at 515.
88 For Denmark, see Re ‘MV Elly Mærsk’, U.2011.3066H, TfK2011.923/1 (Højesteret 
- Supreme Court of Denmark); for Spain, see Petrig, n. 5 above, at Part 2/II/
C/3/a.
